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Abstract
Vehicular networks are organized with high-mobility vehicles, which are a challenge to key agreement and secured
communication among vehicles; hence, efficient cryptography schemes for lightweight ciphers are essential. Many
security schemes for vehicular networks particularly take the secure propagation of traffic-related information into
account. Group communication is desirable in vehicular networks, while groups of friends drive the vehicles to
travel together. In this study, it is applied an asymmetric key mechanism and a group-based Elliptic Curve
cryptograph to authenticate data propagation as also to individually secure group communication. The data
propagation includes a flooding delay mechanism, where each vehicle participant in the propagation calculates an
individual delay for propagation. As groups of vehicles move on the roadway toward same destinations, two
alternative schemes of group key agreement in vehicle-to-vehicle and vehicle-to-infrastructure modes are proposed
to secure group communication among the vehicles. Security analysis results present that the proposed schemes
can effectively prevent malicious vehicle from participating in vehicular communications. Evaluation results show
that the propagation delay mechanism can effectively reduce broadcast collision, and the delay results of the
group key agreement schemes are acceptable.
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1. Introduction
Secure data transmission in vehicle ad hoc networks
(VANETs) has been an important issue. The disclosure
environments with wireless connection are vulnerable to
eavesdrop and spoofing; hence, a number of security
researches in VANETs have been presented. Most of
them have the same goal and vision to protect the vehi-
cle-to-vehicle (V2V) and vehicle-to-infrastructure (V2I)
communications. Public key cryptography is always
addressed as a foundation for VANET security require-
ments, since vehicles have enough capabilities, and be
able to connect to the Internet through fixed stations.
The propagation of traffic-related data such as traffic
conditions, road safety, danger warnings, and vehicle’s
emergency braking is essential in order to keep safety
for all vehicles moving on the roadway. In the real
world, groups of friends could drive vehicles to travel
together, so group communications are possible in
VANETs. For the above reasons, the study focuses on
the secure protocols for the traffic-related data propaga-
tion and group-based communication. The security
issue for the propagation should be authentication repla-
cing encryption cryptography in order to achieve fast
broadcasting. Confidential communications are neces-
sary, since the vehicles in a group always intent to share
data solely among themselves. This study authenticates
the propagation of traffic-related information in the
V2V mode, while other vehicles can authenticate a dis-
closed propagation from a vehicle source using the
asymmetric signature scheme. Structures of secure
group communication are implemented in the V2V and
V2I modes in order to overcome the high-frequency
change in the vehicular topology. Vehicle groups apply
the elliptic curve cryptography [1] to the group key
agreement protocols.
Basically, a VANET is organized with heterogeneous
connections, supporting inter-vehicle, vehicle-to-station,
and inter-station communications. Inter-vehicle as V2V
communication is unstable due to high-mobility vehicles
on the roadway. Road-side stations (RSUs) are deployed
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on the roadside to assist vehicles in Internet connection
and obtaining key-related materials. Most key materials
for VANETs are mainly to safeguard the propagation
information. A reliable propagation of traffic-related
information is essential, so that vehicles can travel safely
and keep the traffic flowing freely over the roadway. It
is a challenge that a vehicle authenticates the incoming
traffic notifications of vehicles next to each other using
ad hoc key cryptography. Multi-hop routing in V2I
mode is hard to achieve directly and timely significant
traffic propagation between any two neighboring vehi-
cles. In addition, the deployment of RSUs on each road-
side to cover all moving vehicles is impossible. Real-
time safety applications always achieve the purpose of
accident avoidance and cooperative driving in VANETs.
The data propagation in the V2V mode without a pro-
pagation schedule will induce the problems of commu-
nication collision and broadcast storms.
Public-key infrastructure (PKI) can protect vehicular
communication using the public key cryptography.
Vehicles have to apply for a valid key pair, certificated
by trusted third party such as Certificate Authority
(CA). In the V2I mode, vehicles connect to the PKI ser-
vices through roadside RSUs, since RSUs always support
wireless and wired techniques. Basically, one participant
represented as a mobile vehicle or a fixed RSU should
have an individual public/private key pair with the certi-
ficate for authentication, communication confidentiality,
and integrity in VANETs. The asymmetric cryptography
is not suitable to secure group communication, while
one vehicle wants to transmit confidentially huge
amount of data such as digital map-based information
and multimedia to other vehicles in a group. Addition-
ally, unstable V2V links cannot endure long periods of
group communication. With the aid of RSUs in the V2I
mode, the scattered vehicles can keep connections dur-
ing a group communication session. Using a symmetric
key to secured group communication improves the per-
formance of delivering confidential data by comparing
the data protected by all individual asymmetric-based
keys of all participants.
Although vehicular computer has enough storage and
computational capabilities without power-supply pro-
blems, light-weight, and strict security schemes are still
essential to timely process data transmission in fast
changes of VANET’s topology. It is applied in this
research the Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) to
establish group keys to achieve secure group communi-
cation. ECDH belonging to the elliptic curve cryptogra-
phy is a variant of the Diffie-Hellman (DH) key
agreement scheme, allowing that two parties create a
common secret key over an insecure channel. ECDH
with 160-bit key lengths provides the same security level
as the DH secret sharing protocol [2]. The original DH
protocol with exponential operations needs a key of at
least 1, 024 bits to achieve adequate security, and there-
fore includes additional computational overhead. For
instance, vehicles A and B try to construct a shared key,
and the public parameters (a prime and base point P as
a well-known generator in DH, coefficients a and b,
elliptic curve y2 = x3 + ax + b) must be set first. A or B
must have an appropriate key pair for elliptic curve
cryptography, comprising an ECC private key, k (a ran-
domly selected integer) and public key Z (Z = kP). Both
A and B have a key pair each. Then, A and B exchange
their public keys, so that A and B calculate particularly
a secret key, GK1(= kAZB = kAkBP) and GK2(= KBZA =
kBkAP).
The remaining of this paper is organized as follows. A
number of security issues in VANETs are described in
Section 2, while Section 3 defines the communication
scenarios and security requirements in a general vehicle
architecture, where a propagation delay mechanism is
also discussed. Section 4 details the key agreement
schemes for group communication, followed by security
and delay analyses in Section 5. Section 6 evaluates the
performance of the proposed schemes in term of com-
munication delay, and message loss ratio, and finally
conclusions remarks and future work are presented in
Section 7.
2. Related works
Vehicular communication has specific characteristics
different from ad hoc communication, which character-
istics may affect the security decisions that developers
have to take. The features exhibited in the V2V and V2I
modes contain the geographically constrained topology,
directional movement, predictable mobility, sufficient
power consumption, and route-based driving coopera-
tion. Most of security issues in ad hoc networks are
not entirely employed nor considered in vehicular
communication.
Key pre-distribution schemes [3] relies on a probabil-
ity of a large number of common keys among nodes
that are not suitable for vehicles with open environ-
ments. Group-based security methods [4-9] usually
outperform other methods in secure one-to-many trans-
mission in terms of performance, scalability, and com-
munication overhead. Lin et al. [4] addressed a security
protocol, named Group Signature and Identity-based
Signature (GSIS), to provide not only the requirements
of security and privacy preserving, but also a group-
based signature scheme to verify data transmission
using a group’s public key. The GSIS solves the mutual
authentication problem for inter-vehicle group commu-
nication applications. A receiver accepting a group mes-
sage can only confirm whether the sender is a member
in the group, though not identifying the sender. A larger
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computational overhead is generated in GSIS for main-
taining a revocation list. The efficient traceability can be
achieved without the storage overhead of managing a
number of certificates at membership and tracing man-
ger. A group key agreement method, called GDH [5],
generalizes upon the well-known DH key exchange. A
sender generates and delivers a list of partial keys repla-
cing the whole shared key to a receiver over the public
network, so the receiver uses its partial key to compute
the group secret. In addition, the particular member of
the group is charged with the task of building and distri-
buting this list. For this reason, this study adopts the
ECDH-based key agreement protocol to establish group
keys for secured group communication among vehicles.
The position-based routing protocol [10] is suitable
for vehicular communication, since the GSP system is
always one of the basic equipments inside vehicles.
Broustis et al. collected some routing schemes to vehi-
cular communication, such as MDDV [11] and GSR
[12]. Most of ad hoc routing schemes are inappropriate,
since vehicle mobility and data forwarding are required
with a direction. One vehicle in MDDV knows the road
topology through a digital map, and its position can be
found in the road network via a GPS device, as also the
existence of their neighbors. MDDV is performed in
two phases, namely forwarding and propagation phases,
to exchange data between two vehicles and to address
the questions about which vehicle can transmit, when to
transmit, and when to store/drop messages. In the GSR
protocol, a vehicle source predicts the position of a
vehicle destination for communication. The source dis-
covers the destination with a request once, and the des-
tination responds its position and velocity back to the
source. Based on the map information, the source trans-
fers data to the destination after predicting its position.
Consequently, GSR combines the position-based routing
with the topological information. In this research, one
head tries to deliver a key product to the next neighbor-
ing head in a global group using the above-mentioned
routing protocol.
Zarki et al. [13] proposed a potential simple security
infrastructure for vehicular communication on the high-
way, called DAHNI. The infrastructure turns vehicles to
have the capabilities of location awareness, ad hoc rout-
ing, accessing to fixed base stations. The DAHNI pro-
vides the security issues including, at least, digital
signature, time-stamping and sequencing, and a certifi-
cation infrastructure. Data in DAHNI environment can
be addressed with three types, namely, fixed spatial data,
spatio-temporal data, and mobile data. Unfortunately,
the DAHNI still presents problems to enable secure col-
lection and dissemination of data timely. Cryptographic
mechanisms of the identity-based encryption [14] and
the proxy signature [15] are often adapted in V2I
communication scenarios. Choi et al. [16] developed
security mechanisms to protect vehicular communica-
tion. In the initial phase, vehicles and RSUs need to reg-
ister their identities with the trust authority (TA) to
capture their temporary key-related materials and pri-
vate/public key pair of elliptic curve cryptography. One
vehicle gains a pseudo-ID and essential parameters for
implementing a temporal signature after authentication.
BSU also receives confidentially a private key and proxy
signature’s parameters from the TA, after authentica-
tion. In any of V2I communication scenarios, vehicle
and RSU have a mutual authentication in order to share
a session key. The vehicle accepts a temporal anon-
ymous certificate from the RSU, and the data transmis-
sion is protected by the session key. In V2V
communication scenarios, each vehicle has a key pair
and a certificate by the Elliptic Curve Digital Signature
Architecture (ECDSA) [17]. Broadcasting traffic-related
information signed by one vehicle with its private key
can be authenticated by others with its disclosure valid
certificate. This study applies the temporary asymmetric
cryptography and signature to the proposed delay pro-
pagation and travel-based group communication scenar-
ios. Each participant needs to hold a key pair based on
the elliptic curve cryptography in advance. The proce-
dures of authenticating the delay propagation and secur-
ing the agreement of group-based key are the main
contributions in the study.
3. System model
A vehicle network under highways and rural roads as
presented in this section not only complies with the
security requirements, but also has some assumptions:
(1) each vehicle is equipped with a wireless omni-direc-
tional antenna, GPS device, and digital map, (2) RSUs
connect to the Internet through wired or wireless tech-
nologies, where two neighboring RSUs can communi-
cate easily and quickly each other, (3) any two vehicles
equipped with the dedicated short range communica-
tions (DSRC) protocol as IEEE 802.11p [18] has the
same transmission range for inter-vehicle communica-
tion, (4) vehicles have event-based sensors to sense traf-
fic and road statuses, and share a digital map such as
Google Map, (5) each vehicle periodically sends a hello
beacon to its neighborhood, and a beacon only contains
the identity of the sender, and (6) RSUs on the roadway
are managed by the servers on the Internet, and the ser-
vers connect to the trusted third party in the PKI ser-
vices, as shown in Table 1.
Vehicles and RSUs are authenticated by trusted third
party through the authentication procedure [16] at the
initialization of a VANET. After identity authentication,
each of them has a valid key pair and warranty/
certificate.
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3.1. Vehicular network architecture and communication
scenarios
Two types of communication modes, V2V and V2I, in
the vehicle network are depicted in Figure 1. The posi-
tion of one vehicle can be tracked by the neighboring
vehicles in a short period through the announced GPS
and velocity information [19]. The GPS data of vehicles
should not be disclosed in VANETs at will, since adver-
saries easily track vehicles according to their GPS and
speed data. Vehicle applications require that vehicles
share their position to each other to achieve the compu-
tation or routing purposes. In this study, vehicles need
to announce their GPS data to participate the delay pro-
pagation of traffic-related information and becoming a
head for the V2V group communication. The VANET
performs the real-time propagation of the emergency
information in the V2V mode, when a traffic-related
event is happening. The vehicles in movement on a
roadway with the reverse direction, different on where
the event happened will not participate in the propaga-
tion, even if received the information; moreover, the
vehicles moving from the front of the event location on
the roadway will also not propagate the information. For
example, Car 2 has a traffic event in Figure 1, while
Cars 1 and 10 will not participate in the propagation of
the traffic event in the network.
Group communication is desirable in vehicle networks,
while groups of friends drive vehicles to travel together.
They can establish a group to share data such as multi-
media and map information, even if their vehicles are
moving close or apart from each other on the same road-
way. Their group communication scenarios are imple-
mented through the V2V or V2I mode in this study. A
physical group with the subset of the vehicles moving
closely each other in the V2V mode must have a mobile
head, and the head always moves at a steady velocity up
or down a slight degree incline. The head has one-hop
neighboring vehicles as its members in the physical
Table 1 Notations in this study
Notations Descriptions
E(Msgs, K) The messages (Msgs) are encrypted by the key, K
Ri or RSUi The identity of a fixed station on the roadside
TPmap A travel route, tp, in the Google MAP
PK/SK An asymmetric key pair, issued by the trusted third party
Ki, j A secret key between vi and vj
k/kP A key pair, private/public keys in the Elliptic Curve Cryptography
VGK A virtual group key among the vehicles in a V2I virtual group
GGK A global group key among the vehicles in a V2V global group
GKset, GKsetP A ECDH-based key pair, generated by the trusted third party at a time, Tstamp, for a set of RSUs, {Rj}, on the route (tp) to
service the vehicles, {vi}, when they travel during the required trip period, ΔT. (i.e. set = hash(tp||ΔT||{Rj}||{vi}||Tstamp))
Certvi The certificate with a valid public key of vi, issued by the trusted third party
GPSvi The GPS position (x, y) of vi
vi or Vi The identity of vehicle i
Eventk An event type of traffic-related information
TH A head vehicle in a one-hop physical group, moving with a steady velocity (or approximately steady velocity)
NListx The latest identities of neighboring vehicles of Vehicle x
gkx A group key, shared between all members and their head, x, in a physical group
Sign(Msg, SK) The digital signature of Msg, signed by the private key, SK
MAC(Msg, K) The MAC code of Msg, encrypted with the secret key, K
vlimit The maximum speed limit on the roadway
RT The standard transmission range of a vehicle
Δdpjs®R The projection distance from Sender(S) to Receiver (R) over the vector from the preceding sender of Sender
Δtp The delay time for the propagation of traffic-related information, defined in Equation (1)
ΔtA The delay time for the role announcement of a TH, defined in Equation (2)
ΔT The trip period required by groups of friends, when they travel together
Warn# A warn message for the propagation of the traffic-related information
Req# A request message for that a vehicle applies for a virtual group
Resp# The response message corresponding to the Req#
Req@ A request message for that one TH tells its members to start the group key agreement process
Notify# A notification message from a RSU to the vehicles contains the information, “the RSU set is ready for your trip”
“||” The meaning of “join”
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group. All of the physical groups only organized by the
scattered vehicles form a hierarchical group, denoted as a
global group. In Figure 1, Cars 7-9 know about each
other and could organize a physical group, and Car 8 is
the head. The other alternative of group communication
is to establish a virtual group in the V2I mode. The vehi-
cles organize multiple localized groups with the RSUs on
the roadside of the travel path. One of the RSUs orga-
nizes a localized group with the subset of the vehicles;
hence, all of the localized groups form a virtual group.
The RSUs participating in the virtual group are denoted
as head avatars to service for all of the vehicles. Still in
the Figure 1, cars 6, 10, and 11 on the same roadway
organize a virtual group with RSU1 and RSU2. The set of
RSUs on the roadside is managed by the trusted server
on the Internet; hence, the server must connect the
trusted party to maintain the security requirements of the
RSUs. If a vehicle tries to apply for a virtual group, then
the server will select the appropriate RSUs for it.
Consequently, V2V-based global and V2I-based virtual
groups are addressed, with different ways of selecting
their heads. A global group is appropriate to the vehicles
without connection gaps, and a virtual group is appropri-
ate to them with high-frequency broken connections.
3.2. Propagation delay mechanism
A self-determined delay scheme is combined with the data
propagation in order to avoid broadcast storms and propa-
gation collision. A vehicle, denoted as r, receives a fresh
traffic-related warning message from one of its front vehi-
cles, denoted as s, and must delay a little time before pro-
pagation, denoted as Δt, given by the following equation:
tp = α × (1 − ((Speeds − Speedr)/vlimit))(dpjs→r/RT) (1)
where, vlimit is the maximum speed limit in the area
where the vehicle moves, Speeds and Speedr are the
Figure 1 The V2V and V2I communication modes in VANETs.
Hsieh et al. EURASIP Journal on Wireless Communications and Networking 2011, 2011:167
http://jwcn.eurasipjournals.com/content/2011/1/167
Page 5 of 16
velocities of s and r, individually, smaller than vlimit, RT
is the transmission range of vehicles, Δdpj is the projec-
tion distance from s to r over the vector from the pre-
ceding sender of s to s, and a is a value proportional to
the number of the rear neighboring nodes of r. For
example, vi+1 , vi+2 , and vi are represented as s, r, and
the preceding sender of s in Figure 2. Vehicle vi+2 must
wait a self-determined delay time as calculated in Equa-
tion (1), once vi+2 receives the traffic-related information
from vi+1 . Vehicle vi+2 will continue to propagate if
receives no same message from its rear neighboring
vehicles, after waiting the delay time. To calculate the
projection distance, vi+2 needs to gain the GPS positions
and the velocities of vi and vi+1 . The sensitive data of vi
and vi+1 are attached to the propagation from vi to vi+2 ,
and furthermore vi+2 has to verify the data. Section 4.1
details the procedure of propagating a warning message
within an authentication format.
3.3. Security requirements
A traffic-related message always involves safety-critical
information. Attackers could try to endanger road-traffic
or node-vehicle safety by broadcasting incorrect or
tamping messages. For the reason, the propagation gen-
erated from a source must achieve data integrity and
identity authentication. The propagation of a traffic-
related message is attached with GPS data of vehicles
for calculating their individual delay time; hence, the
propagation procedure involves the verification of the
sensitive data.
A session group key for a global or virtual group
should be established quickly among participating vehi-
cles, due to fast topology changes in VANETs. The vehi-
cles use the valid group key to achieve secure
communication in terms of data authentication, data
confidentiality, and data integrity. Group communica-
tion in this study is designed with the purpose that
groups of friends drive vehicles traveling together;
hence, the vehicles always know about each other. To
apply for a virtual group, one of them has to connect to
the server on the Internet through one of its neighbor-
ing RSUs. The mutual authentication between Vehicle
and BSU is necessary to prevent against adversaries
masquerade as legal participants. An attacker could
apply for a virtual group using a travel route of the digi-
tal map, where the vehicles are traveling at present;
hence, it is important that how to prevent those applica-
tions from the attacker. Head avatars in a virtual group
need to hold essential key materials for the vehicles, and
thus, the vehicles on a travel route will share securely
data through the head avatars in the virtual group. Two
groups with different members cannot produce the
same group key, even if they travel on the same route
toward same destinations. Groups without any RSU
need a global key to communicate securely among the
vehicles.
4. Proposed security mechanisms
This section introduces the procedures of the delay pro-
pagation of a traffic-related message and secure group
communication.
4.1. Authentication of the delay propagation
If detecting a traffic-related event, one vehicle will
broadcast a new warning message to the neighborhood,
and as any of the neighboring vehicles receive the mes-
sage will ignore the propagation if received other warn-
ings recording the same event in advance. Basically,
traffic-related events happen to close or same to the
locations of the vehicle sources, and the neighboring
vehicle can detect whether the propagations are same or
not by comparing to the event type, the position of the
event happenings, and timestamps provided by the
sources.
Suppose a propagation path containing the participat-
ing vehicles (vi, i Î 0 ~ i + 2) is denoted as v0 ® v1
Figure 2 Example of the delay propagation of the traffic-related information.
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®...® vi ® vi+1 ® vi+2 , and v0 is the vehicle source,
first broadcasting a fresh traffic-related warning mes-
sage. The message, denoted as Warn#0, includes the
sensitive data (i.e., identity, GPS, and speed) of v0, an
event type (Eventk), and the timestamp. Vehicle v0 has
to sign the Warn#0, so that other vehicles can verify the
message in the future. Vehicle v1 modifies the Warn#0
by adding its sensitive data and timestamp, once
received and verified it. Vehicle v2 performs same tasks
as Vehicle v1, after receiving the Warn#1 from v1.
Accordingly, the other vehicles in the propagation path
can follow a format to make their warning messages.
The warning format only retains the identities, GPS
data, and velocities of two closest previous participants
for computing the individual delay time. The certificates
in the format will verify whether the participants and
their attached data are valid in VANETs. Consequently,
a warning message propagating in a lengthy path can
efficiently be authenticated in each hop, while the packet
size of the message is constant. The authentication pro-
cedure of the delay propagation in the path is given as
follows:
1. v0 detects a traffic event, and propagates immedi-
ately a warning message:
Warn#0(v0, GPSv0, Speedv0, Eventk, Tstamp#0), Sign
(Warn#0, SKv0), Certv0.
2. v1 verifies the source, and calculates the delay time.
The direct distance from v0 to v1 replaces the projection
distance of the delay time, since v1 has the preceding
sender of v0. After waiting the delay time, v1 propagates
the modified warning message:
Warn#1(v0, v1, GPSv0, GPSv1, Speedv0, Speedv1 ,
Eventk, Tstamp#0, Tstamp#1, Speed#1), Sign(Warn#0,
SKv0), Sign(Warn#1, SKv1), Certv0, Certv1.
3. v2 verifies the source, and calculates the delay time,
the two preceding senders, v0 and v1. After waiting the
delay time, v2 propagates the Warn#2 as follows:
Warn#2(v0, v1, v2, GPSv0, GPSv1, GPSv2, Speedv0,
Speedv1, Speedv2, Eventk, Tstamp#0, Tstamp#1,
Tstamp#2), Sign(Warn#0, SKv0), Sign(Warn#1, SKv1),
Sign(Warn#2, SKv2), Certv0, Certv1, Certv2.
4. v3 performs the same tasks as v3, but removes the
data of v1 in the modified warning message, since the
data are useless to v4, in calculating the delay time.
After waiting the delay time, v3 propagates the Warn#3
as follows:
Warn#3(v0, v2, v3, GPSv0, GPSv2, GPSv3, Speedv0,
Speedv2, Speedv3, Eventk, Tstamp#0, Tstamp#2,
Tstamp#3), Sign(Warn#0, SKv0), Sign(Warn#2, SKv2),
Sign(Warn#3, SKv3), Certv0, Certv2, Certv3.
5. The propagation continues by following on the
remainder path: v3 ® v4 ... ® vi-1 ® vi ® vi+1 . The
warning format of vi+1 ’s propagation is denoted as:
Warn#i(v0, vi, vi+1 , GPSv0, GPSvi, GPSvi+1, Speedv0,
Speedvi, Speedvi+1, Eventk, Tstamp#0, Tstamp#i,
Tstamp#i+1), Sign(Warn#0, SKv0), Sign(Warn#vi, SKvi),
Sign(Warn#vi+1 , SKvi+1), Certv0, Certvi, Certvi+1.
4.2. Secure communication in a global group without
RSUs
When areas have no RSU such as rural roads, the vehi-
cles traveling together organize a number of one-hop
physical groups. Each of them can know its neighboring
vehicles by broadcasting periodically a hello beacon.
Each physical group needs a head, called TH, moving
with a steady velocity in order to coordinate the estab-
lishment of a group key. Any of vehicles keeping a
steady velocity for a tiny period of time will automati-
cally become a TH and announce the role with a two-
hop broadcast strategy, while having no neighboring
THs. The two-hop broadcast strategy means that an
announcement can be forwarded to two-hop neighbor-
ing nodes. To avoid communication collisions during
the announcement period of THs, each TH announces
its role after waiting the individual delay time, as deter-
mined by Equation (2):
tA = β ×
dtpTHj→Dest
Max({dtpTHj→Dest} )
× NumofTHs, j ∈ 0 ∼ n, (2)
where the NumberOfTHs is the predictive number of
THs, larger than or equal to the number of the practical
THs (n), dtpTHj→Dest is the approximate distance
between the locations of THj and the traveling destina-
tion, Dest on the route of the digital map, the
Max({dtpTHj→Dest} ) as a function will return the maxi-
mum value of the set, {dtpTHj→Dest}, and b is a value
proportional to the average propagation delay of one
hop. In Equation (2), vehicular computers using the
map-based service APIs such as GoogleMap [20] can
easily calculate the approximate distance between two
locations on a route in the digital map. The announce-
ment information contains the GPS position of the TH.
Each of the one-hop neighboring vehicles that receive
the announcement will respond as it becomes a member
of the TH. Each member selects only one TH as its
head in the physical group.
Suppose one TH, THx, has as one-hop neighboring
members, denoted {Mi}. THx broadcasts a request to {Mi}
for establishing a group key, after appending its identity,
velocity, GPS, and the list of {Mi} within a particular
sequence, denoted as NListx to the request. The vehicles
in {Mi} moving on the front locations of the travel road-
way have a high priority on the front of the arrangement
of NListx. The request is defined as follows:
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THx ® {Mi}: Req@(vx, Speedx, GPSx, NListx), Sign
(Req@, SKTHx), Certx.
Suppose that the vehicles {M1, M2, ..., M(x-1)} in the
NListx are neighbors to THx, and {Mi} exchange the
ECDH-based public keys each other. Each of Mi gener-
ates a private and public key pair, K1 and K1P, while P
is a well-known generator. In addition, THx also has its
key pair, Kx and KxP. At the beginning of the key agree-
ment protocol, M1 as the first vehicle broadcasts its
neighborhood immediately. M2 cannot broadcast its K2P
until it receives the K1P from M1. Just like M2, the
others broadcast their public keys according to the
order in NListx. THx can help one of {Mi} forwarding its
public key to the next member. After exchanging com-
pletely public keys, each Mi has to unicast the result
(K1K2...K(i-1) K(i+1)...K(x-1)P) without the KiP to THx. THx
returns individually a response by multiplying its private
key for Mi, such as (K1K2...K(i-1)K(i+1)...K(x-1)KxP). Finally,
Mi multiplies the response with its private key to have







the group key is shared among the THx and its {Mi} in
order to secure communication in the physical group.
Any TH knows its two-hop neighboring THs, after com-
pleting the announcement procedure. All of the THs in
the physical groups establish a global group key for all of
the vehicles based on the position-based routing. To avoid
the key disclosure, each TH multiplies a pseudo private
and public key pair, gk’ and gk’P. The TH moving at the
top of the traveling path must become the root to start the
key agreement process, while the other THs are always
moving behind itself. Supposing that there are multiple
THs, denoted as (TH1, TH2, ..., THn-1, THn), and THj
always moves behind THj-1. The procedure started by
TH1 using the on-demand routing in the V2V mode for
establishing a global group key is detailed as follows:
1. TH1 forwards its <gk1’P > to its neighboring TH2
using one of ad hoc routing schemes such as the posi-
tion routing [10]. Once the data is stored, TH2 generates
and sends a product <gk2’gk1’P > to TH3. Just like the
previous TH, TH3 generates and sends a product
<gk3’gk2’gk1’P > to TH4.
2. The process of forwarding the product continues by
following the remainder path: TH4 ® TH5 ® ... ®
THn-1. THn-1 delivers the
∏n−1
i=1 gki




′P from THn-2 .




multiplying the product of THn-1 with its pseudo private
key, gkn’. However, THn must return its public key,
gkn’P, back to THn-1 using the previous routing path.




′P by (gkn-1’gkn’P), and returns the gkn-
1’gkn’P to THn-2 .
5. Just like THn-1, THn-2 generates the key, and
returns the product gkn-2 ’gkn-1’gkn’P to THn-3 .
6. Returning the product continues by following on
the remainder path: THn-3 ® THn-4 ® ... ® THj ... ®
TH1. THj returns the product to its previous THj-1,∏n
i=1
gki ′P after generating the group key.
7. TH1 receives the product,
∏n
i=2
gki ′P from TH2.
The key agreement process is done, and the group key,∏n
i=1
gki ′P has shared among the THs.
8. Finally, each TH distributes the global group key to
its member by encrypted with the physical group key,
gkx. The message is defined as follows:





If the last step is excluded, there are the extra encryp-
tion/decryption overheads. The secure group communi-
cation from Mi to the others is then detailed as follows:
Mi ® THi:
Stream#(Mi, Multimedia, Tstamp), MAC(Stream#, gki), or
E(Stream#(v1, Multimedia, Tstamp), gki), MAC(E(...), gki)
THi ® {THj| j Î 1 - n, j! = i}:
Stream#, MAC(Stream#, GGK), or E(Stream#, GGK),
MAC(E(...), GGK)
THj ® {Mj}:
Stream#, MAC(Stream#, gkj), or E(Stream#, vgkj),
MAC(E(...), gkj), where {Mj} are the members of THj.
4.3. Secure communication in a virtual group with
multiple RSUs
According to the vehicle architecture in Section 3.1,
legal RSUs on the roadside are managed by a number of
servers on Internet. The servers are assumed to be able
to connect to the trusted third parties. The scattered
vehicles moving in the trip can organize a virtual group
with the RSUs. Figure 3 illustrates that v1 asks for a vir-
tual group to establish group communication, while the
vehicles (v1-vn) travel on the route toward the common
destination. The others (v2-vn) could also apply for the
group through their neighboring RSUs during traveling.
Suppose that the v1 sends a request with the travel-
related information to a valid RSU, RSUi. The RSUi
checks whether v1 and the request are valid, by examin-
ing the certificate and the attached timestamp. If the
request is not yet expired, RSUi checks its local storage
whether the RSU set exists or not, in order to serve the
same vehicles on the route within the same trip period.
RSUi responds immediately to v1, if the set is always
available in the storage; otherwise, if the set is not exis-
tent or has been expired, RSUi will forward the request
to its server on the Internet, denoted as Root. The
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procedure is that v1 applies for a set of the RSUs using
the information of a travel route which is detailed as
follows:
Phase 1. Vehicle v1 sends Req# to RSUi, and attaching
with the identities of the vehicles, the required trip per-
iod (ΔT), the current timestamp (Tstamp), and the tra-
vel route in a digital map (TPmap). The request is signed
with its private key.
v1 ® RSUi: Req# (v1, ΔT, Tstamp, TPmap, {vi |i Î 1-n}),
Sign(Req#, SKv1), Certv1
Phase 2. Suppose that the set of RSUs is not existent
for the request. RSUi forwards the request to the Root
with an attached MAC code, while sharing a common
key with the Root. If RSUi and Root have no common
key, the signature of RSUi will replace the MAC code.
RSUi ® Root:
Req# (v1, ΔT, Tstamp, TPmap, {vi}), Sign(Req#, SKv1),
Certv1, MAC(Req#||Sign, KRoot, RSUi), or
Req# (v1, ΔT, Tstamp, TPmap, {vi}), Sign(Req#, SKv1),
Sign(Req#, SKRSUi), Certv1, CertRSUi
Phase 3. Root authenticates the Req# using the v1’s
PKv1, and RSUi is verified through the MAC code or its
signature. If the authentication is successful, Root deter-
mines the subset of RSUs located on the route, TPmap,
and sends an encrypted Resp# back to RSUi. The Resp#
is attached with the identities of the selected RSUj, the
TPmap, and an expiration time (ETime), a VGK, and a
key pair for {Rj}, (GKset, GKsetP) (i.e., set = hash(tp||ΔT||
{Rj}||{vi}||Tstamp)). The response is encrypted by the
key shared between RSUi and Root, or the public key of
RSUi to prevent eavesdropping and modification from
attackers on the Internet.
Root®RSUi:
E#(Resp#’tp, Sign#Root, E(Resp#tp, Sign#Root, PKv1),
KRoot, RSUi), MAC(E#, KRoot, RSUi), or
E#(Resp#’tp, Sign#’Root, E(Resp#tp, Sign#Root, PKv1),
PKRSUi), where Resp#tp is generated for the vehicles (i.e.,
Resp#tp = Resp#({Rj}, TPmap, ETime)), Resp#’tp is gener-
ated for the chosen RSUs (i.e., Resp#’tp = Resp#(VGK,
GKset, GKsetP, {Rj}, {vi}, TPmap, ETime, ΔT)), and Sign#-
Root (or Sign’#Root) represents that the Resp#tp (or
Resp#’tp) is signed by SKRoot.
Phase 4. RSUi forwards the Resp#’tp to the other
RSUs in the {Rj}. Any two RSUs connecting to the Inter-
net can easily establish a shared secret key, KRSUi, RSUj.
In addition, RSUi has to forward the encrypted Resp#tp
to v1.
RSUi ® {RSUj|j Î 1-n, j! = i}:
E(Resp#’tp, Sign#’Root, KRSUi, RSUj), MAC(E(...), KRSUi,
RSUj)
Figure 3 Illustration of the architecture of a virtual group, and the five phases of the key agreement to establish a VGK, shared
among the vehicles (v1 - vn). Assume that the vehicles travel on the route toward the common destination.
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RSUi ® v1: E(Resp#tp, Sign#Root, PKv1)
Phase 5. Each of {RSUj} stores the tuple, (GKset,
GKsetP, {Rj}, {vi}, TPmap, ETime, ΔT), in the storage until
the ETime is expired. {RSUj} sends a notification to {vi},
if the vehicles is moving in their transmission ranges.
Each RSUi ® a subset of {vi}:
Notify# (the RSU set is ready for your trip), Sign
(Notify#, SKRSUi), CertRSUi
{RSUj} as head avatars assist the scattered vehicles in
aggregating a VGK within their transmission ranges.
Suppose that one of {RSUj}, Rx, has a few of the vehicles
{vy|y Î 1-j, n >j} within its transmission range, exactly
as a cluster. The members in {vy} are arranged in a
sequence, when vj always moves behind vj-1. Figure 4
depicts a localized key agreement process among Rx and
{vy}, with the following steps:
1. Rx replies a message, Resp& to {vy} as a subset of
the vehicles, when vi in {vy} sends Req# to Rx.
Rx ® broadcast: Resp&({vy}, ETime, GKsetP), Sign
(Resp&, SKRx), Certx.
2. One member (v1) generates a key pair, kv1 and kv1P,
and then broadcasts kv1P to other members. When
another member (v2) receives the key, then multiplies it
with its private key, denoted as kv2kv1P. To avoid a
broadcast storm, v1 as the most front of members in the
road broadcasts first, and other members delay a little
time to broadcast. Eventually, each member performs
the same product, Kv1Kv2...KvyP.
3. Each member filters out its private key from the pro-
duct, and unicasts the extracted result to Rx, for example,
v1 sends the Kv2...KvyP to Rx. Members can unicast confi-
dentially the result to Rx, using the public key, GKsetP.
4. Rx receives a product from one member, and then
generates a response by multiplying with the key, GKset
in the storage. For example, Rx constructs the product,
GKset Kv2, ..., KvyP, for v1, then unicasts it to v1. Conse-
quently, Rx and {vy} share a group key, denoted as vgkx
(= GKset
∏x
i=1 KiP ), in the localized group.
5. This step is optional. {Rx} can determine whether to
share the VGK to the {vi} in the localized groups. Rx
sends confidentially the VGK to its members by
encrypting with the vgkx.
The vehicles will share a VGK, if completing all steps
of the five phases. Each of the vehicles shares securely
data with the others, when the data are encrypted by
the VGK. If the last step of the fifth phase is excluded,
head avatars will have the extra encryption/decryption
overheads. The secure group communication without
the last step from vi to the others is detailed as follows:
vi ® Ri:
Stream#(v1, Multimedia, Tstamp), MAC(Stream#,
vgki), or
E(Stream#(v1, Multimedia, Tstamp), vgki), MAC(E(...),
vgki)
Ri ® {Rj|j Î 1-n, j! = i}:
Stream#, MAC(Stream#, VGK), or E(Stream#, VGK),
MAC(E(...), VGK)
Rj ® {vj}:
Stream#, MAC(Stream#, vgkj), or E(Stream#, vgkj),
MAC(E(...), vgkj), where each vehicle in {vj} is moving
within the transmission range of Rj.
5. Security and delay analyses
Attackers could generate incorrect propagation of infor-
mation based on fake traffic events to influence traffic
conditions, even paralyze the vehicle network. In addi-
tion, group communication including sensitive data in
the private group will provoke adversary’s interest. This
section analyzes the security issues for the delay propa-
gation and group communication.
5.1. Security of the propagation of traffic-related
information
A Warn# message with the signature and warrant/certi-
ficate of a vehicle source can achieve the identity and
data authentication, after verifying using the public key.
Each of the vehicles in the propagation procedure can
trust the sensitive data of the two preceding senders as
their GPS positions and speeds, after verifying success-
fully their signatures.
In the only V2V mode, attackers without the valid key
pair issued by the trusted third party cannot create or
forward an incorrect warning message. A compromised
vehicle could go through a wrong warning propagation
and try to modify a warning propagation. If a compro-
mised vehicle fixed in a location creates a wrong propa-
gation to attack the network, it is most probably
without success. The detection range of event-based
sensors is smaller than the transmission range of
802.11p in vehicles, and therefore the neighboring vehi-
cles can easily find no event happening in its neighbor-
hood. Already compromised vehicle does not modify
easily the propagation, since the propagation is signed
by its two preceding senders and the vehicle source is
found in the propagation path. The compromised vehi-
cle could conspire with them to fabricate an incorrect
warning; however, the adversaries could be found with a
high probability by their valid neighbor vehicles.
As the network supports the V2I mode, the trusted
RSUs service as guards may accuse a compromised vehi-
cle that creates or forwards incorrect Warn# message. If
the number of accusations against a suspected vehicle
achieves a threshold, the certificate of the vehicle will be
expired and added in the certificate revocation list
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(CRL) by the trusted party. If a trusted vehicle accuses a
suspect vehicle, the accusation will be verified by a
number of its neighboring RSUs. If the accusation is
correct, then the RSUs will report the result to the
trusted third party through its management servers.
A replay attack could be generated, while the two
neighboring vehicles in a propagation path collude to
propagate repetitively a warning message. The vehicle
receiving the replay message can check whether the
warning is expired or not according to the timestamp
given by the vehicle source. Three timestamps are
attached in a Warn# message: one is attached by the
source, and the others are attached by collusive vehicles.
The difference in time between the two previous time-
stamps of the Warn# is represented as the actual
elapsed time of the event happening. The vehicle can
determine whether the event happening is expired or
not, when each event type has a stable reparation period
announced by the government responsible for the traffic
event. Consequently, the propagation of a traffic-related
message reaches the security degrees consisting of
source non-repudiation, data integrity, the prevention of
replication attacks, and delay effect.
5.2. Propagation delay
We illustrate two cases for the propagation delay
scheme using the architecture presented in Figure 2.
The IEEE 802.11p operates under 5.9 GHz and supports
speed up to 190 km/h with a normal transmission range
of 300 m. The vehicles move on the highway (HH) and
rural roads (RR), individually corresponding to two
examples. Table 2 shows the delay time of propagations
for the examples. Suppose that RT is 300 m in Equation
(1), the other values of vi+1 , vi+2, and vi+3 are given in
the table. The GPSi, GPSi+1, GPSi+2, and GPSi+2 are set
to (24.164477, 120.670084), (24.164492, 120.671157),
(24.164676, 120.671841), and (24.164935, 120.672254).
The derived unit of GPS is latitude and longitude,
(x, y), and the derived unit of Speed (Sp) is Kilometer
per hour (Km/h), same as that of vlimit. To calculate
Figure 4 Illustration of establishing a group key in a localized group.
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the projection distance, vi+2 and vi+3 first gain their pro-
jection positions over the vector from vi to vi+1 . Second,
each of them calculates the straight distance from Spi+1
to itself. For example, vi+2 calculates the distance using
Equation (3) as follows:
dpj = 2 × arcsin
(√
sin2(a′) + cos(xi+1) × cos(xi+2) × sin2(b’)
)
× EarthRadius, (3)
where a’ is set to (xi+1 - xi+2)/2, b’ is set to (yi+1 - yi+2)/
2, and EarthRadius is set to 63, 78, 137 m.
Vehicle vi+2 and vi+3 moving within the transmission
range of vi+1 have the projection distance, 64.15 (m) and
103.03 (m) over the vector from vi to vi+1 . In the HH, vi
+2 moves more faster than vi+1 , and vi+3 moves slower
than vi+1 . Vehicle vi+3 must propagate the traffic-related
information faster than the propagation of vi+2 . Basically,
vi+2 will listen and gain the propagation from vi+3 , then
be able to stop its propagation to avoid broadcast storms.
In the RR, vi+2 moves slowly and vi+3 moves fast toward
vi+1 . Vehicle vi+2 must propagate the traffic-related infor-
mation faster than the propagation of vi+3 . The vehicle vi
+3 will decide not to propagate for collision avoidance,
after waiting a period as the delay time of vi+2.
5.3. Security of V2I group communication
Vehicles and RSU can authenticate each other through
the asymmetric cryptography. RSUs are maintained by
the servers on the Internet, and the servers are sup-
ported with the trusted third party. If an invalid RSU
was recorded in the CRL, then servers will eliminate it
from the establishment procedure of virtual groups. An
attacker without the servers’ support masquerades diffi-
cultly itself as a valid RSU to attend the head avatars of
any virtual group.
Group communication is designed for the groups of
friends driving vehicles to travel together; hence, any of
vehicles always holds their total identities. It is impossi-
ble that an outside attacker joins easily and successfully
their trip in the V2I mode. During the period of apply-
ing for a new virtual group, to deliver the Req# from a
vehicle to the Root through a RSU can achieve data
integrity, source authentication, and non-repudiation of
transmission. If the RSU uses a secret key shared with
the Root to encrypt their operations with a MAC code,
then delivering Req# or Resp# between them will
achieve data confidentiality and integrity. In addition,
any two BSUs communicate securely each other using a
secret key or their public keys. In this case, the commu-
nication achieves data confidentiality and integrity.
A compromised vehicle cannot apply for the same vir-
tual group by sending the same set of the vehicles’ iden-
tities and the travel path to a valid RSU, unless it
belongs to one of them. In other words, any two sets of
the VGK and the key materials (GKset, GKsetP) deter-
mined by the Root (i.e., a server with the trusted third
party) cannot be same, only if the values of the para-
meters, tp, ΔT, {Rj}, {vi}, and Tstamp are the same in
two different applications.
To perform the key agreement protocol for a localized
group, the members exchange their ECDH-based public
keys and send particular products to the BSU, individu-
ally. The delivery of the products is secure using the
GKsetP to prevent the middle attack. Group communica-
tion in a localized group can achieve data confidentiality
and integrity, when the members adopt the localized
group key to encrypt their communication.
5.4. Security of V2V group communication
The V2V group communication can be implemented,
following the conditions: no connection gap among the
traveling vehicles, and enough THs moving at steady
speeds. The vehicles are divided into different one-hop
physical groups. The delivery of a Req@ from one TH
to its neighboring members achieves data integrity,
source authentication, and non-repudiation, since the
TH’s signature was appended to the request. Each TH
cooperates with its one-hop members in key agreement
to gain a common key gkx. Since THs move on the
roadway in an order, they can cooperate to get a com-
mon key, GGK, after an exchange of ECDH products to
make a round trip from the head TH to the tail TH and
back again. Both of the key agreements are safe unless
attackers solve the elliptic curve discrete logarithm pro-
blem. The confidentiality and integrity of data sharing
among the vehicle in a physical or global group can be
reached.
An attacker without a valid certificate cannot become
a TH. Any compromised vehicle with a valid certificate
cannot easily join a traveling group, since the vehicles
know each other. A compromised vehicle could disguise
itself as one of the vehicles by broadcasting a beacon
with the compromised identity, and therefore, the two
vehicles with the same identity move together at the
beginning. The adversary can successfully perform the
Table 2 Illustration of the delay propagation with vi, vi+1, vi+2, and vi+3 in Figure 2
vlimit Spi+1 Spi+2 Spi+3 Δdpji+1®i+2 Δdpji+1®i+3 0.5a Delayi+2 Delayi+3
HH 110 95 105 70 64.15 103.03 6/12 4.24/8.47 3.75/1.82
RR 60 45 15 50 64.15 103.03 6/12 1.94/3.88 2.62/5.26
GPS (x, y) in GoogleMap [20], Sp (km/h), vlimit (km/h), and delay (s)
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key agreement in its physical group, before the key
agreement process of GGK. To avoid the expansion of
damage into other physical groups, THs must append
their identities to the products during the agreement
period of GGK, as detailed in Section 4.2. For example,
THk forwards its product to the next TH, and the pro-
duct is defined as follows:
THk → THK+1 :<
k∏
i=1
gk′iP, {M}TH1, {M}TH2, · · · , {M}THk >
The compromised vehicle can easily be detected, while
each TH knows which vehicles are moving within which
of physical groups.
6. Performance evaluation
In this study, each vehicle conserves a key pair to
encryption/decrypt data at the VANET initialization. In
addition, various public key cryptographies were applied
to the initialization process. Some participants establish
a session key using their public key cryptography, and
therefore hash and session key operations are adopted
to consume few overheads and to improve the encryp-
tion/decryption performance. Vehicle exploits a hash
function such as HMAC-160 or RIPEMD-160 to verify
the integrity of data communication in our evaluation.
Each vehicular computer in our experimental environ-
ment is implemented using a Linux platform PC with a
2.4 GHz CPU, 1 GB of memory as hardware and sup-
porting the GNU C/C++ library, which will have enough
capability to implement Elliptic Curve and RSA crypto-
graphies. This study evaluated the eclipsed time of pro-
pagating traffic-related packets, the key synchronization
time in the global and virtual groups, and the delay
results of comparing our schemes with GDH [5], and
GSIS [16].
The delay propagation scheme, denoted as DelayProp,
compared with a natural propagation, denoted as Natur-
eProp. Vehicles always flood immediately while receiving
a propagation message in the NatureProp. Figure 5
shows the propagation with a message loss ratio in the
DelayProp smaller than that in the NatureProp. We also
compared the experimental results, while DeplayProp is
designed with various average numbers of neighboring
nodes of each vehicle. All DelayProps with Equation (1)
reached a small ratio in the packet loss estimation, even
if the network size was increasing, such a ratio of
approximately 1%. The value of a as the number of
neighbors of a vehicle increases, the delay time
increases. Since the width of a road is limited with few
lanes, the average number of neighboring vehicles was
set to 6, 12, 18, or 24 in the evaluation. Consequently,
the network size had a little impact for the proposed
scheme. The “DelayProp with 18” and “DelayProp with
24” have a high value of neighbor-based vehicle density,
and therefore only few vehicles participate the propaga-
tion process, and most of them always listen the propa-
gation from its rear neighboring nodes after waiting an
individual time. Figure 6 depicts the propagation delay
time of the four DelayProp with various numbers of
neighboring nodes. The environment area of the
VANET in “DelayProp with 6” is max in the four propa-
gations; hence, it has more delay than the others. The
percentage of the area, that any of the four propagations
are covered with, is always larger than 93%.
The proposed key agreement scheme is compared
with the group-based GDH and GSIS schemes. The
GDH and GSIS established a group-based secret key
and a group-based public key individually. Both of them
adopted DH with exponential operations. We evaluated
the proposed scheme with a 160-bit group key for gk,
vgk, GGK, and VGK, and the others were implemented
with a 1024-bit key. The group communication adopted
the seven or eight members in each physical or localized
group, and the total number of vehicles in a VANET is
65 nodes. Figure 7 depicts the comparison of the aver-
age delay time of the three key agreement schemes
without GSIS, since the procedure of its group-based
signature was initialized in the offline phase. The key
agreement in a virtual group obtained the aid of the
valid RSUs, thus the delay time was very low. A global
group without RSUs in VANETs had a large delay,
when the traffic load was increasing. The global group
had a small delay before the traffic load was 65, while
vehicle heads always helped exchanging ECDH-based
products.
Figure 8 depicts the comparison among four schemes
for secure group communication. After finishing the key
agreement protocols, members in a group shared a
secret key. The network using GSIS to data transmission
performed the verification of the group-based signature
replacing the encryption and decryption operations. The
communication architectures of Virtual Group-160 and
GSIS supported the aid of fixed RSUs. For this reason,
their average delay was inclining to a stable status. How-
ever, the consumption overhead of verifying a signature
was larger than encryption or decryption operations.
The average transmission delays of GSIS and Virtual
Group-160 were tending to 60 and 25 ms, individually.
The others built secure communication in the only V2V
mode, so that the delays of data transmission were ser-
ious, as the traffic load increases.
7. Conclusions
This research paper discusses the security issues for two
communication scenarios in vehicle network, the propa-
gation of traffic-related messages, and the group-based
communication scenarios. The security issues of the
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Figure 5 Impact of traffic load on message loss ratio for the propagation of traffic-related information.
Figure 6 Comparison of the propagation delay of DelayProp with various the average number of neighboring nodes.
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Figure 7 Comparison of the average delay of three key agreement schemes.
Figure 8 Comparison of the average delay of the four schemes for secure transmission from one source to all members in a group.
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delay propagation achieved authentication and non-
replication. The propagation delay mechanism avoids
problems of communication collision and broadcast
storms, but increases the propagation delay. Our simula-
tion results indicated that the scheme improved the per-
formance of the data flooding. The delay time (seconds)
is acceptable, since to deal with traffic-related events
such as a car accident needs a lot of time (minutes or
hours).
Secure group communication scenarios can be imple-
mented in the V2I and V2V modes. In the V2I mode,
BSUs strengthen the security of group communication.
The key agreement process in a localized group is easily
accomplished with the head avatars in the virtual group.
In addition, the vehicles distributed in different localized
groups can perform secure group communication by the
aid of their localized group keys and a VGK, issued by
the third party. The establishment of group key for
secure V2V group communication can easily be accom-
plished because of the security features of the ECDH-
based key agreement protocol. The elliptic curve group
key with a small size still has the same security strength
with RSA and DH. The V2V group communication with
the aid of the position-based routing consumes less time
in the establishment of a secret key among THs in a
global group.
In general, key management for secure group commu-
nication is a challenge in ad hoc networks. The group
key management in the proposed schemes is easily to be
solved. According to the scenario of group communica-
tion, groups of friends traveling together can easily gain
identities of all vehicles. For this reason, it is impossible
that a new vehicle can join to the group during the per-
iod of traveling. However, a member could leave the tra-
veling group in the real world. In order to reduce the
complexity of rebuilding group keys, heads in the V2I or
V2V group cannot distribute the virtual or global group
key (VGK or GGK) to their members. If one member
leaves from a physical or localized group, then the head
should re-build the gk or vgk key. In case that one of
head avatars was not available, then the vehicles will
need to re-apply for a virtual group to avoid attacks.
Alternatively, if one of THs leaves, then the members
belonging to the TH must re-organized physical groups,
and the GGK will be re-builded. The vehicles in the
other physical groups not belonging to the TH still keep
the original status.
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